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ABSTRACT
In this paper we report on research exploring the privacy, secu-
rity and safety implications of children being able to program
Internet of Things devices. We present our methodology for
understanding the contexts in which children may wish to use
programmable IoT, identifying risks that emerge in such con-
texts, and creating a set of questions that might guide design of
such technologies so that they are safe for child users. We eval-
uate the success of the methodology, discuss the limitations of
the approach, and describe future work.
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INTRODUCTION
With the Internet of Things (IoT), new forms of technolog-
ical engagements are possible not only for adults but also
for children. As the IoT vision takes tangible shape, con-
cerns regarding privacy, security, and reliability have emerged,
alongside various ethical concerns. Concerns pertaining to
children and IoT have thus far centred around their use of
connected smart toys [16, 17], neglecting the potential for
children to appropriate programmable IoT Maker platforms,
or indeed use platforms that are designed specifically for child
programmers, to access a world of risks that they may be ill-
prepared to navigate. Particularly concerning is that children
who may still have critical gaps in their privacy and security
understandings are being enabled to program IoT devices, and
that parents’ own lack of technical understanding of IoT may
make it difficult for them to provide assistance to their children
in managing their privacy and security concerns as they do
with other digital technologies [12].
Children programming IoT is not the distant possibility it
may seem. Physical computing is being introduced into class-
rooms as an alternative to screen-based computing education
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[27], and this approach has been shown to have certain ad-
vantages in terms of promoting motivation, collaboration, cre-
ativity and tangibility [28]. In particular, the BBC micro:bit
(see http://microbit.org/) has been developed as a platform for
teaching children the principles of computer science and engi-
neering by engaging them in creative play in the sensor-based
world that surrounds them. A child-friendly design makes it
possible for children to learn to create basic devices in under
an hour and progress to more advanced IoT device creations
through experimentation with the many different components,
including connectors for attaching external sensors. In con-
trast to other programmable IoT devices (e.g. Arduino and
Raspberry Pi) that have seen some adoption in the classroom,
the micro:bit ecosystem does not presume a level of profi-
ciency that includes knowledge of electronics and circuitry
and the ability to program, configure networks, or configure
and install software. Careful consideration was given to the
visual design elements of the device so that it would engage
truly novice, and possibly timid, technologists; programming
was made accessible through a visual programming language
and drag-and-drop file transfer to the micro:bit; all of which
was underpinned by a constructionist [23] approach that pro-
motes learning of computer programming—including sequen-
tial progression through more advanced languages such as
JavaScript and Python—through creative experimentation in a
world where sensor-based devices are ubiquitous.
Having developed a tool that enabled children to program the
Internet of Things, the makers of the BBC micro:bit were
concerned about the privacy, security and safety implications
of deploying the device; hence, a decision was made to restrict
some functions like those involved with radio communication,
strengthen security around others such as Bluetooth pairing,
and limit its use to safe educational (closed) environments. In
this state, there are few if any risks to children, but this is traded
off against the learning potential of the device. According to
one of the BBC micro:bit’s developers, “you could lock the
whole system down so that it becomes a pointless education
system and kids could be learning nothing, or you can start
to open that up to a point where they will start to learn stuff
and even about the security, but of course when [you] do
that they become more and more insecure” (key informant
interviewee). Moreover, locking this one device down does
nothing to prepare children for safely navigating the wider
world of IoT devices that they are likely to encounter, most of
	  
Figure 1. The BBC micro:bit.
which will not have been designed with such a clear ethical
imperative and focus on vulnerabilities of child users.
In the UK, efforts at formal training around online safety has
evolved from static webpage interaction advice to include guid-
ance surrounding Web 2.0 and mobile interactions, covering
new territory such as social media bullying and sexting; but as
yet there is no IoT component to this curriculum. Some guid-
ance has been developed by organizations such as the Family
Online Safety Institute (FOSI) and the National Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) to support
parents and children in navigating emergent risks in the mar-
ketplace of smart connected toys,1 but this guidance pertains
to interactions that are developed by adults and governed by
increasingly strict privacy and security legislation as enforced
by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) in
the US and the new European General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR). As digitally adept children find new ways to
capitalize on the creative control afforded by readily available
and increasingly diverse platforms for developing their own
IoT devices, designers will need new strategies for anticipat-
ing the risks presented by their technologies across the full
potential of contexts in which they may be used by children,
as well as new tools for evaluating whether they have attended
to all relevant considerations in these contexts.
In this paper we present and evaluate a novel methodology
for envisaging risks and identifying pertinent questions that
might guide the design process toward ethically sound tech-
nology outputs. We demonstrate this methodology in action
in IoT4Kids, a study exploring what children are likely to
do with their new capabilities to create their own IoT device
interactions, and what risks they are likely to encounter as a
result. We identify three key categories of desired use that
have emerged through workshops with child participants and
1This is an active area of work for FOSI, as evidenced by their policy
research [6], round table events [8] and white papers [7]; and is a
more nascent area of interest for NSPCC [22].
illustrate potential risks of such uses through “use scenar-
ios”, i.e. fictional amalgamations of participants’ own designs.
These are then used as the basis for developing a Risk Mitiga-
tion Checklist. Drawing from the use scenarios, the checklist
contains salient design considerations that might underpin a
privacy by design approach when developing IoT for children.
We end by evaluating the success of the methodology, dis-
cussing the limitations of the approach, and describing future
work.
INTERNET OF THINGS CONTEXT
A relevant backdrop to this work is the uniqueness of IoT de-
vices, principally that they exhibit agendas and agency which
are entirely unrelated to elements of the design the user sees
and interacts with. In these contexts, it cannot be assumed
that any given device, software, or service is solely designed
to help the user achieve a headline activity. As an example,
the manufacturer Vizio sold smart televisions that logged the
programs users were watching and passed this information
to third parties for the purpose of marketing. Vizio became
notorious because the company failed to include details of this
activity in the device’s user agreement, hence the data gather-
ing task was illegal. The data that was logged and passed to
third parties had absolutely no relevance to the user’s activity
(watching television).
What further differentiates IoT devices from their non-IoT
counterparts is not simply the complexity which occurs in
systems, but rather the new types of agency, value, and power
that they enable through the “networkification of the existing
non-Internet world” [25]. IoT devices often have a digital
shadow (i.e. data), which, although usually resulting directly
from an interaction, is rarely visible at the time that action
takes place. These data are essential to making the things of
the IoT work. For example, data may feed learning algorithms;
may be central to a company’s business model; may be neces-
sary to drive a device’s functionality; or could be necessary to
fulfill a regulatory requirement. In some circumstances these
present-but-unseen data mean that significant portions of an
IoT device’s agency may be obscured, undermining the agency
of the human user.
These properties present a significant design challenge in terms
of protecting users from malevolent actors and enabling in-
formed consent, in particular when it comes to vulnerable
child users. Critically, IoT affords a multiplicity of potential
devices and use contexts on a scale not normally encountered
by designers, for which risks emerge throughout a constella-
tion of connected devices and services. We argue that new
methodologies are needed for expanding thinking to risks not
readily apparent to developers of IoT devices; and while the
methodology we present in this paper is not the definitive an-
swer to this, it does open up an avenue for future work that
may prove helpful.
APPROACH AND FINDINGS
The aim of our project, IoT4Kids, was to understand the po-
tential uses of programmable IoT by children so that we might
anticipate the privacy, security and safety risks that emerge in
the context of such uses. An overview of our methodology is
as follows:
• Student Engagement Days: To elicit programmable IoT
uses, we invited children who were old enough to grasp
a visual programming language (Blocks) to learn how to
program the BBC micro:bit, see inspirational examples of
what other children have used the micro:bit to create, and
then to complete an activity to design (sketch) their own
micro:bit creation.
• Team and Partner Workshops: To better understand the
privacy, security and safety implications of the children’s
design ideas, we explored as a team the technical feasibility
of these ideas, i.e. how a child might realistically satisfy the
motivation underpinning their design using components that
would be available to them. We then conducted two Partner
Workshops with project partners FOSI and the NSPCC to
understand how these real world uses of the micro:bit might
map onto known risks relating to predatory behavior.
• Use Scenarios: To communicate our findings of the risks
of children programming the BBC micro:bit and similar de-
vices, we translated our insights into amalgamated, persona-
based ‘use scenarios.’ We elicited further feedback on the
implications of the use scenarios from key informants at
The Micro:bit Educational Foundation, FOSI and NSPCC.
• Guiding Questions: To develop guidelines for the develop-
ment of acceptable programmable IoT devices for children,
we extracted key questions emerging from our use scenar-
ios that would focus design thinking toward relevant risks,
thereby enabling developers to proactively attend to these
risks at design time.
We provide further detail on these stages of research below.
STUDENT ENGAGEMENT DAYS
We ran two engagement days, recruiting a class of 32 Year 5
students (ages 9-10) and a class of 25 Year 6 students (ages
10-11). Three adults—teachers and teaching assistants—were
present at each event to provide familiar authority to assist the
researchers in managing the children, and to ensure children
were supervised throughout the day; they did not lead any
portion of the instruction or design activity. The focus for
the first half of the engagement days was to deliver a unique
educational experience (university outreach) to local schools,
aiming to ensure that the children directly benefited from their
participation. The second half was oriented toward data col-
lection, with a secondary aim of inspiring children to take an
interest in computer science. This was framed as an imagina-
tive design task guided by the question, “What would you love
to build with your micro:bit?” In designing the activities, we
drew from [5] to maximize the children’s role as informants.
Recognizing that technology-based imaginative tasks can be
difficult for children [9], we scaffolded (see [18]) the task with
activity sheets that provided gentle prompts. Students were
asked to complete two such sheets (Figures 3 and 4):
1. Working in small groups (5-6 students, 15 minutes), they
wrote their exciting ideas into thought bubbles;
Figure 2. Activity to teach children how to program the micro:bit.
2. Working independently (30 minutes), they developed their
favorite idea further, giving their concept a title and a de-
scription, writing who it was for, and drawing their design.
Our methods emulate the drawing-telling technique created by
[34] and used by [4]. Researchers walked around throughout
the creative activities, speaking to children about what they
were drawing and recording these conversations to be later
transcribed. In the first engagement day (with the 9–10-year-
olds) but not the second (with the 10–11-year-olds), there was
time for children to do a one-minute presentation of their idea,
with about 75% eagerly volunteering to present. These pre-
sentations were also audio recorded and transcribed. Our final
dataset contained transcripts of conversations with and presen-
tations by children about their designs, and design artifacts
(completed worksheets).
The research team then carried out a clustering activity on the
design artifacts (drawing on information provided about them
in conversation with the children) using an iterative inductive
coding approach to develop broad categories of use. We began
by identifying groupings of designs that bore a similarity with
one another, and provisionally named that similarity. In refin-
ing our proto-categories, we sought to identify categories that
described the same order of thing, arriving at categories that
described “what the child wants from the tool.” Our coding
and analysis was further supplemented by desk research. To
account for uses that might not have emerged in our engage-
ment days (either by chance or as a function of our particular
workshop design), project researchers looked at the kinds of
devices other children have developed using the micro:bit,
looking at online posts as well as records kept by project
partners the Micro:bit Educational Foundation. We contin-
ued coding these uses until the researchers reached saturation,
i.e. no new categories were found. In total, we identified three
distinct categories as described below.
Assistance
Designs in this category were often motivated by a desire to
complete mundane tasks, perhaps in a more effective or at
least more interesting way. These tools included simple re-
minder/alarm devices, activity trackers, universal remote con-
trols, trackers for lost items, and navigation/direction. How-
ever, they also included surveillance-based concepts, for ex-
ample: “When they are doing something bad it will make a
buzzing sound;” “[I]f your kids are in their bedroom playing
the micro:bit can tell you [the parent] if they are doing any-
thing wrong;” and “[I]f you are still in bed, even if you stand
Figure 3. Worksheet exercises part 1.
up to turn [off your alarm clock] and get back into bed, it will
still know.” A significant majority of designs, both by our own
participants and by other children creating with the micro:bit,
fell into this category.
Common characteristics of this type included: a) activity
and/or location tracking, e.g. made possible by linking in with
externally managed systems and databases; b) building a pro-
file of one’s activities through time and space; and c) placing
trust in the guidance provided by the device.
Play
These designs were motivated by a desire to experience simu-
lation of activities that children are otherwise unable to experi-
ence or forbidden from engaging in. Children imagined using
the micro:bit to take over and drive a car; providing a point
of access to virtual simulation of a zombie apocalypse; or
controlling lights and sounds to create a haunted house effect
to scare siblings. The focus of this category is on ‘risky play’
(including ‘pranking’) as meaningfully distinguishable from
‘intimate play’ (see Companionship below).
Common characteristics of this type included: a) fulfilment
of risk taking behavior; b) meting out punishment or enacting
retribution, and c) leveraging technology to distance oneself
from or cloak a ‘crime’, e.g. doing something that is socially
inappropriate for which the child would otherwise face pun-
ishment.
Companionship
These designs were motivated by a desire for emotional sup-
port and the easing of loneliness. Designs often incorporated
the micro:bit into toys or dolls to make them more interactive.
As children described, “[Y]ou can program it to be your friend
if you don’t have any. . . and make it talk to you so you are
not lonely;” or similarly, “When you are sad it cuddles you.
When you had an argument with your friend it cheers you
up. It solves your problems. It teaches you things you don’t
know. It tells you bedtime stories (if you want it to). It is
your dream.” A slight variation on this theme was the idea
of being able to send out a distress call to a rescuer, with the
Figure 4. Worksheet exercises part 2.
device communicating, “I don’t like being on my own with no
friends, please help me.”
Common characteristics of this type included: a) monitoring of
negative emotions, e.g. fear and sadness; b) mimicking human
interaction, e.g. affection, friendship, love; and c) providing a
source of nurture.
TEAM AND PARTNER WORKSHOPS
Insights gleaned from the student engagement days were
shared among the project team and with project partners. Team
Workshops explored how the children’s desired uses of the
micro:bit might be realized (or approximated) by children with
basic to moderately advanced programming skills using read-
ily available technical components. This resulted in several
prototypical design concepts that amalgamated children’s real
and desired uses of the micro:bit, and initial story concepts (in-
cluding personas and motivations) for plausible real world use
scenarios. Partner Workshops were then conducted with repre-
sentatives from FOSI and the NSPCC to identify the types of
risks the children’s uses might expose them to. Researchers
presented the prototypes and their backstories to the partners,
and proposed risks that were evident from our technical per-
spective. Partners then offered feedback and assisted in further
identification and elaboration of risks from their perspectives
as experts in predatory behavior.
USE SCENARIOS
Drawing from our understanding of desired uses of the mi-
cro:bit, plausible routes by which children might technically
realize these desires, the risks they introduce with various de-
sign decisions, and contexts of vulnerability that may affect
how the child interacts with their device, we more fully de-
veloped our set of prototypes and personas and wove them
into fictionalized use scenarios. This exercise enabled us to
explore how different ways a child might satisfy a particular
design motivation affects the kinds of risks they are ultimately
exposed to. We discussed our findings with key informants
at The Micro:bit Educational Foundation2 to garner feedback
on the key takeaways from our use scenarios and to gain an
understanding of how our process for identifying risks com-
pared with their own processes. We further conferred with our
partners at the NSPCC to understand how risks to children in
other online environments might map to our use scenarios and
iterated them accordingly.
For this paper, we present only three use scenarios: one from
each use category which together reflect the spectrum of pri-
vacy, security and safety implications of children programming
IoT devices. Each scenario is presented in three parts: 1) a
fictional narrative describing a child’s use of the micro:bit; 2)
an analysis of the risks entailed by that use; and 3) a discussion
of other risks pertinent to the use category (Assistance, Play,
and Companionship, respectively).
Maia
Maia is eleven years old and lives at home with her parents and
younger sister. Her parents work long hours, so with much to
do in the evenings they are very strict with the kids’ bedtime,
ensuring they are settled down with lights out earlier than most
other children in her class. She shares a bedroom with her
sister, and on occasion they will get giggly at bedtime, which
Mum discourages by restricting their treats.
One night while the sisters lay awake in bed, Maia whispers,
“I can’t sleep. It’s too early to go to bed.” Her sister agrees,
and they come up with a plan: they will be quiet and pretend
to be asleep until they know their parents have gone to bed,
and then get up for a tea party and a play. But they discover
it is hard to know for sure when their parents are asleep, and
they don’t want to get caught.
Maia has recently learned how to use a micro:bit, and it occurs
to her that she could use it to alert her when her parents are
in their bed. She connects her micro:bit to a force sensing
resistor and programs the LED array to light up when it senses
pressure. After several successful trials in their own beds,
Maia sneaks into their bedroom and places the sensor under
her parents’ mattress while her sister is distracting them. That
night, they wait for the micro:bit to light up, and to make sure
their parents are asleep, they wait 30 minutes before sneaking
downstairs for their first Midnight Feast.
2The Micro:bit Educational Foundation comprises a number of com-
panies and organizations, including the BBC, working in collabora-
tion (https://microbit.org/about/).
Risks to Maia (and her parents)
The risks that are normally identified relating to IoT are those
that are directly mediated by data, i.e. what we might call
‘digital risks.’ But Maia demonstrates that risks occur in the
physical realm too, as a direct result of engagements with IoT
platforms. In her case, Maia is using the micro:bit to arrange
a situation where she can act without adult supervision, in
direct contravention of the rules laid down by her parents.
There are real world examples where doing so has resulted
in serious harm. In 2017, for example, several young girls
incurred serious burns as a result of the social media game
Fire Fairy [30]. The game, which lured young girls who were
fans of the television show “Winx Club: School of Witches,”
instructed them:
“At midnight when everybody is asleep, get up from your
bed and go around the room three times, then say the
magical words: ‘Alfey kingdom, sweet little fairies, give
me the power, I’m asking you.’ Then go to the kitchen
silently, so no one notices you or the magic of the words
will disappear. Switch on the gas stove, all four burners.
But do not light it. You don’t want to get burns, do you?
Then go to sleep. The magic gas will come to you, you
will breathe it while sleeping and in the morning, when
you wake up, say: ‘Thank you Alfeya, I’ve become a
fairy.’ And you will became a real fairy of fire.”’
Most likely, no harm will come to Maia, but if her design is
successful, she is leveraging the micro:bit to disrupt the power
balance in her house, undermining her parents authority with
potential negative implications for future interactions. This
risk is subtle; but attending to disruptions caused in family
dynamics should be a relevant concern for designers, as it may
make effective parenting (e.g. rule setting and punishment)
more difficult. And while effective parenting is by no means
the only barrier protecting children from harm in their digital
engagements [33], particularly younger children who rely on
parental management of digital risk [12] cannot be supervised
during covert IoT device building and use.
The more readily apparent risk is that of invasion of privacy—
though this is not a risk to Maia as much as it is a risk to
her parents. Certainly if adults were to find out that compa-
nies were mining data about their sleep patterns without their
permission, there would be an uproar. And if Maia had instru-
mentalized an audio recorder or camera rather than a pressure
sensor the invasion would be all the more glaring. It is im-
portant to note, here, that the risks emerging from children’s
appropriation of IoT are not necessarily isolated to the child
user him/herself.
Risks of Assistance
Consistent with other studies (see [13] for summary of works
in this area), our data indicates that children ages 9–11 have
very little understanding of their own privacy or that of oth-
ers. This not only manifests in surveillance based uses of the
micro:bit, but also in a demonstrable lack of understanding of
what constitutes personal data. For example, children did not
appear to perceive a substantive difference between collecting
data about the number of steps they are taking and collect-
ing data about their steps (or that of others) through time and
space. This is especially problematic when combined with a
lack of understanding about a) the types of data that might
be beaconed out by devices (e.g. information about whether a
person is in or out of their house), and b) data storage security.
To be fully functional, many of the children’s designs would
require setting up a user profile that is stored on an external
server, in which case the risks to the child depend on the often
unknown level of security that company has implemented, and
the privacy settings a child may consent to without understand-
ing their implications. If intercepted through weak security,
activity data might enable a predator to determine a child’s
present location or predict their future location to orchestrate
dangerous face-to-face interactions. It is also possible, and
increasingly likely in the future as a market for such services
emerges, that companies may offer children easy and free
storage of personal data with a view to selling that data on
to commercial organizations, or indeed for more nefarious
purposes. Finally, we note that the many Assistance tech-
nologies that are designed to provide useful instructions to a
child—in particular ones that tell them where to go if they are
lost—could be hijacked in order to lead a child into dangerous
situations.
Troy
Troy is 13 years old, living with his parents and younger
siblings (sister, Asia, 11; brother, Lucas, 9). He is constantly
getting annoyed with his younger siblings invading his space.
For his birthday, Troy’s parents got him a small shed at the
bottom of the garden that can serve as his own private space
away from his siblings. Excited about what they have recently
learned about electronics in school, Troy and his three best
friends have been using the den as a Maker Space, inventing
and programming their micro:bits to make their robots and
remote-control cars come to life. They call the shed their
“clubhouse” and hold secret club meetings where they discuss
their inventions.
Asia frequently interrupts the club’s meetings; and Lucas
sneaked into the clubhouse and broke one of the remote-
control cars. Troy and his friends call an emergency meeting
to consider ways to stop annoying siblings from entering the
den. They consider special locks but decide it would be more
effective to teach them a lesson, so they instead design a way
to deliver a small shock to intruders. Their final design uses
two micro:bits and fine wire; mains power is connected to
an electromagnetic relay system; and the micro:bit’s radio
buttons A and B trigger the on/off command to arm/disarm
the door.
Lucas gets shocked trying to enter the shed and comes crying
to Asia, who then marches to the shed, knocks on the door,
and informs Troy that if they do that again she will tell their
mother what they have been doing. As a counter measure,
Troy and his friends decide they need to get some dirt on Asia,
so they set up a secret video recorder in her room using a
Raspberry Pi, a Raspberry Pi camera module, a PIR motion
sensor module and 3 female-to-female jumper wires. At their
next secret meeting, they watch what Asia is doing on the
camera and make fun of her when she picks her nose. When
Lucas gets shocked again and Asia tells Troy she is going to
tattle on him, he explains that they have tape of her, and if she
does, they will post a video of her picking her nose for all of
her friends to see.
Risks to Troy (and his siblings)
Health and safety issues arise in both the build and imple-
mentation stages of Troy’s design. A tool that can trigger
an electric current to shock someone is an alarming and dan-
gerous concept, perhaps especially so when the recipient is
a child. Making it more dangerous, even if Troy had experi-
mented with this type of device in other settings, he may not
have the know-how to understand potential differences in the
voltage of the mains power to his shed which could be high
enough to cause serious injury. And for Troy, although the
device is relatively simple to make, there is an obvious risk of
accidental shocking.
The device that Troy and his friends set up is rigged to deliver
a shock when someone touches the door, as opposed to Troy
having to press a button to administer the shock. This is sig-
nificant: since the punishment to Lucas is mediated passively
through the device it is likely easier for Troy to psycholog-
ically distance himself from the act (it would be much less
likely that he would tase his brother, for example). Troy also
demonstrates how quickly pranking behavior can escalate,
both in terms of physical risk and psychological impact. He
uses the device to gain access to places he would normally
not be allowed, and then uses that access to violate Asia’s
privacy and wield control over her in a bullying manner. He
also leverages the door handle shocking device in ways that
may be subtly bullying, i.e. to enforce social in-groups and
out-groups. This feels normal enough as a sibling dynamic,
but would more readily be understood as peer-to-peer bullying
in, say, a school setting. Finally, if indeed Troy does post the
video of Asia for her friends to see, this could lead to cyber
bullying and online humiliation (see [21]).
Risks of Play
Most designs that fall into the Play category are not designed to
cause a victim physical harm, so it may be difficult for children
to understand when and how their device creations negatively
affect those around them. And because Play category designs
lend themselves most readily to use by a group of children,
pack mentality, peer pressure and collective exuberance can
increase the likelihood of getting carried away to the point
of causing real harm. The 2017 Snapchat challenge “Letter
X” is an example of this. The game encouraged children to
post “the most vile abuse possible” regarding other children’s
physical appearance and personality, with others then piling
on with further insults [26].
Where devices afford a physical distancing between actions
and consequences, this could further heighten vulnerability
to health and safety risks to oneself and others. When tech-
nologies allow children to conduct themselves without fear
of punishment, trolling behavior is likely to thrive; so too is
illegal activity, from minor infractions and petty crimes to
more serious criminality.
A final risk of Play is the threat of predators making contact
with and grooming young people. As places where children
congregate to share ideas, predators might taking advantage
of IoT Maker forums to access children [10, 32]. For ex-
ample, concerns have been raised regarding the sexualizing
of young children through the game Habbo Hotel, in which
teenagers were taking part in online sexual relationships [3];
and Minecraft forums have been used by pedophiles to groom
children [20].
Freya
Freya is twelve years old. Her father has left the family and
she misses a male role model. Her mother is busy with the
other younger children and work, so Freya spends much of her
time in her bedroom on computers and has recently expanded
her interest to include making and tinkering with gadgets. She
is often lonely and has become withdrawn due to some recent
incidents of having been bullied.
Freya has discovered online forums and YouTube videos on
how to make and build physical computing concepts. She
built her first interactive toy—a teddy bear that opened and
closed its mouth using a micro:bit and servos—by following
instructions provided to her in an online forum. For her next
attempt, she followed online guidance to connect an audio
interface, including a microphone and speaker into her soft toy
shark, and with the code supplied by a forum contributor she
was able to program the speech interface that enabled her to
ask Sharkie a question and get a response. The device consists
of a micro:bit, microphone and speakers, and uses blocks from
an unlicensed code library extension to connect to Internet
speech recognition and a search engine to return and speak
back results.
Freya became friendly with an online persona, IoTFriend,
who helped her design and develop IoT devices. Chatting
frequently, IoTFriend has become her confidant, offering emo-
tional support about the breakup of her family and advice
about how to handle bullies. IoTFriend asked for Freya’s ad-
dress to send her the equipment to build a GPS tracker into her
connected toy, so if she was being bullied IoTFriend would be
able to rescue her wherever she was. IoTFriend sent Freya a
Raspberry Pi, SD Card, Wi-Fi Adapter and GPS USB dongle.
The coding and build was complex and required the knowl-
edge of an advanced Maker. However, she had IoTFriend to
provide code online, offer her step-by-step tutorials and chat
her through the process. Freya now takes Sharkie with her
everywhere in case she needs rescuing.
Risks to Freya
It would not take long for a predator to identify Freya as partic-
ularly vulnerable to manipulation by asking simple questions
about why she wants to build an IoT toy; and predators could
easily draw vulnerable children to them by use of temptingly
titled instructions, e.g. “How to build a toy that plays with you
when you are lonely.” Children like Freya are increasingly
adept at finding How-To resources online, but may not under-
stand that the instructions they find online are not necessarily
safe to follow. In Freya’s case, the instructions she was given
by someone she learned to trust directed her to construct the
means by which a predator could make physical contact to
kidnap or otherwise harm her. Even without the use of GPS, if
a child walks around with a soft toy that incorporates a device
that broadcasts wifi signals or Bluetooth packets, it hunts for a
wifi playstation and broadcasts IDs, which can be used to track
a child’s patterns of activity to assist a predator in intercepting
the child.
Finally, even if we assume good intentions on the part of IoT-
Friend, there is no assurance that IoTFriend is sufficiently
knowledgable of privacy and security risks they may be intro-
ducing through the code they are passing on to other users—or
indeed that it is a child who would end up using the code. The
My Friend Cayla doll is a good example of how easy it is to
do privacy and security wrong. This IoT toy doll was made
famous on account of being banned in Germany under legisla-
tion that classifies it as an espionage device [19]. Technically
the doll is extremely simple and is based around a Bluetooth
microphone/speaker embedded inside an otherwise normal
plastic doll, with the microphone and speaker being driven
from a supporting mobile app. The doll uses a combination
of local processing and supporting cloud services to deliver a
range of functions such as storytelling, gaming, and chat. The
audio recordings, along with other data captured by the doll,
are not confined to the smartphone but are sent via remote
servers belonging to the doll manufacturer, where they are
subsequently shared with another company who provide the
voice recognition service. The doll is also insecure; the Blue-
tooth connection can easily be hijacked which would provide
an attacker full control over the audio data the doll records,
as well as what it says. Furthermore, the database that sup-
ports the dolls functions—an implementation of SQLite within
the doll’s smartphone app—was originally not encrypted and
hence all the doll’s scripted chat responses, including a list
of banned words, could easily be tampered with. Subsequent
versions encrypted the database but left the decryption key
vulnerable. Finally, requests that were passed from the smart-
phone software to the web, which were not encrypted and sent
in plaintext, were relatively easy to intercept.
Risks of Companionship
Our data indicates a clear desire among children to seek emo-
tional support from IoT technologies, seemingly particularly
true for girls. As Freya demonstrates, children may volunteer
information in ways they are taught not to in online safety
education (such as it is) if they are tapping into a culture of
collaboration and exchange that is demonstrably productive,
i.e. leads to them being able to build technologies that work.
But it is important to note that it is technically feasible—if not
today, in the next 2-3 years—for children to satisfy a desire
for emotional responsiveness in remedial ways (e.g. using A
and B radio buttons to indicate happy or sad; getting person-
alized Alexa-type responses based on prior reactions) that, if
intercepted, would enable a predator to time their interactions
to moments of peak vulnerability. The more sophisticated
the backend technologies children may incorporate into their
devices become in terms of providing human-like responses,
the more difficult it will be for children to distinguish between
a digital interaction they are having through a device and a
human interaction they are having with an entity who has hi-
jacked their device.3 Critically, once an emotional bond has
3For examples of toys that have been successfully hacked and hi-
jacked, see [7].
been established between child and device, if that device has
been hijacked a child is easily influenced and manipulated to
undertake risky behaviors.
GUIDING QUESTIONS
In considering ethical design of IoT technologies, designers
face the unique challenge of considering not only human-to-
device interactions, but also the implications of “inter-machine
chatter” [15] and the consequences of the indirect interactions
one might have with various individuals, organizations and
services. IoT for children brings into focus the risks asso-
ciated with peer-to-peer abuse, unknown adult abuse (i.e. by
strangers), and known adult abuse (e.g. by relatives, teach-
ers, coaches); as well as the risks of radicalization, unethical
commercial exploitation of children’s data, and improper man-
agement of identifying information about children.
Determining the full extent of risks to children when they
programme IoT devices will require the development of some
means of accounting for the “ecologies” [1] (see also [29]) in
which the consequences of children’s own device creations
play out. One possible route towards improving thinking in
this area is to develop a set of questions to consider as part
of one’s development process, as per the EthicalOS (ethica-
los.org) risk mitigation checklist, which was developed to help
tech companies predict the consequences of their products and
“avert ethical disasters” [24]. The EthicalOS collaboration has
produced a toolkit, a risk mitigation checklist and a number of
use cases, but not a readily apparent methodology for generat-
ing these outputs to predict consequences of technologies in
other contexts. Note that while there are similarities between
ours and the EthicalOS project, our methodology was devel-
oped independent of EthicalOS and only later borrowed the
structure of the risk mitigation checklist and risk zones.
We present below a set of questions that emerged directly
from the use scenarios we have described above. To translate
these scenarios to guiding questions, we adopted an inductive
coding approach. Our process was as follows:
1. We re-read the use scenarios (including the narrative, the
discussion of risks to the fictional child, and the discussion
of risks from the category of use) and identified particular
aspects that contributed to risk until we reached saturation;
2. For each of these risks, we wrote a brief description of the
issue (e.g. “undermines parental authority”, “parents are
unaware”, “emotionally vulnerable child”);
3. We then conducted a clustering exercise, assigning provi-
sional headings to emerging categories, and reorganizing
until satisfied with the groupings and Risk Zone titles;
4. Finally, we reworded the identified issues in the form of
questions.
Risk Zone 1: Authority and Discipline
• Will the technology undermine authority, and what might
the consequences of this be?
• What might the technology enable children to see or do
that they haven’t been able to before? Are carers or other
authority figures aware the child has these new capabilities?
If not, would they approve if they were to find out?
• Does the technology afford covert interactions? Is it im-
portant that others are able to tell when a child is using the
technology?
• Does the technology enable a child to escape punishment
for something they would otherwise be punished for? What
risky behavior might children engage in as a result that they
otherwise wouldn’t?
• Does use of the technology need to be supervised? How
likely is it that an adult would be able to supervise this ac-
tivity? Would that supervising adult be sufficiently knowl-
edgable to protect the child from risks?
Risk Zone 2: Malevolence and Accidental Harm
• How might the technology or data produced by it be used by
a malevolent actor? Is there any way to identify malevolent
users? How will malevolent users be policed?
• For any given use of the technology, what would it look like
if a user ‘took it too far’?
• Are those with whom a user interacts able to determine that
user is a child? What are the risks of those entities knowing
they are interacting with a child? What are the risks of those
entities not knowing?
Risk Zone 3: Emotionality and Socialization
• Does the technology appeal to emotionally vulnerable chil-
dren? If so, how might the technology exacerbate these
vulnerabilities?
• Does the technology isolate children? If designed differ-
ently, how might it foster real world socialization?
• What emotional state does the technology foster? Is this
conducive to deliberation and responsible decision making?
Risk Zone 4: Governance and Accounting
• Will people be producing content or components that extend
the original functionality of the technology? How will these
individuals and content/components be vetted?
• What tools and services would users interact with as part
of normal use of the technology (e.g. servers)? Is it prefer-
able and possible to build a secure ecosystem that supports
interaction from start to finish?
• Is it obvious to a child when they are generating data and
where it is going? Is this information presented in a way
that promotes informed consent?
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Use Scenarios
Representativeness
We are conscious that our methods for eliciting desired uses
of the micro:bit may preclude some of the most problematic
of children’s actual desired uses. The engagement days were
supervised by teachers and delivered within the context of
an educational field trip. Children were primed to think of
academically worthy uses of the technology, in particular ones
that demonstrated they had learned something from the morn-
ing’s instruction.4 It is likely that they were also censoring
ideas that they thought their teachers would not approve of,
which otherwise they would happily program in their bed-
rooms. We glimpsed a darker design instinct in one of the
designs from Engagement Day 1: A child had proposed to
his friends the idea of a (President) Trump-Seeking Missile,
but was scolded by his teacher and forced to develop a more
appropriate idea.
We suspect that this self-censorship significantly shaped the
distribution of designs across the three use categories—not
only for our engagement day data but also for desk research
data, as children are unlikely to post ideas online that they
know they will get in trouble for. Play is an integral part
of childhood and therefore Play seems a natural use of the
micro:bit. The percentage of design ideas that fall into the
Assistance category may also reflect children’s difficulties
with imaginative tasks, as they often replicated devices they
had seen elsewhere. On the other hand, Assistance uses of the
micro:bit are arguably the most realistically implementable,
so when children were imagining more creative uses it is less
likely they would be able to realize these designs.
While further research is needed to validate this assumption,
we believe that children could have darker fantasies for how
they might harness IoT technologies, but that they largely
lack the skill set to implement such ideas. This may not hold,
however, as additional resources become available through
adult-driven forums and How-To videos.
Comprehensiveness
Project partners reported finding the use scenarios highly il-
luminating as well as a useful format for capturing risks to
children from IoT. In their words, they reported finding the
scenarios “an effective way of beginning to map some of the
child protection challenges that might emerge with the inter-
net of things;” that they “moved [our] thinking along;” and
that “as a reality check as a team we should be doing more of
these.”
That said, our project would have benefited from tighter feed-
back between the us and the project partners during the de-
velopment of the use scenarios. In particular, we are aware
that our understanding of predatory behavior (their area of
expertise) is somewhat lacking, and as such there are contexts
of abuse that are not accounted for by these use scenarios,
e.g. abuse by adults who are known to the child. Although as
of yet there have not been any publicized cases of connected
toys being used as a tools for known-adult abuse, cases have
started to emerge of IoT technologies within the home being
weaponized as tools for power and manipulation against do-
mestic abuse victims [31]. Technologies within the home have
been used to scare, intimidate, monitor and confuse victims of
domestic abuse. Often victims have little or no knowledge of
the data collected by the device, or are unaware that the known
perpetrator is controlling the device. IoT devices for children
4Notably, the 10- to 11-year-olds were much more preoccupied
with demonstrating learning than the 9- to 10-year-olds, e.g. asking
whether their designs needed to include instructions for building the
device.
could be appropriated for the purposes of manipulation, mon-
itoring and gaslighting, becoming a secret weapon against a
child. Further use scenarios are needed to help circumscribe
the risks of known-adult abuse through IoT for children.
Usefulness
We recognize that the use scenarios we have provided in this
paper are examples of rudimentary implementations of IoT
at best, and that the risks they point to are relatively mild.
Nonetheless, the scenarios were highly generative of questions
that are worthy of consideration not merely to attend to the
minor risks represented in the use scenarios but also to more
serious risks that could emerge in, for example, more advanced
uses of IoT by children. In this sense, an extra step might be
useful for future work where the Risk Mitigation Checklist is
used to generate a final set of higher risk use scenarios.
Our work might further have benefited from better engagement
with risk management literature in helping us appropriately
weigh credibility, likelihood and impact in understanding the
risk landscape [2, 14]. Going forward, explicating these di-
mensions might help in evaluating which components of the
micro:bit ought to be locked down and which can be left open.
Guiding questions
Additional Considerations
We were particularly struck by the fact that many of the desired
uses of IoT we described in our use scenarios should, to an
adult, seem immediately problematic; however, it was clear
from our Engagement Workshops that children do not readily
perceive ethical issues their designs raise. Most obviously,
children often produced designs that adults would view as
major violations of others’ privacy, e.g. surveillance based
uses of the micro:bit. This is in keeping with theories of
typical moral development: Children in the age group we
sampled, who incidentally are just starting to receive computer
programming education through their schools, tend to display
pre-conventional morality [11]. This developmental level is
comprised of two stages that an individual progresses through
in sequence, both of which are characterized by an egocentric
focus on the direct consequences of actions, as enforced by a
moral authority (e.g. a parent, a teacher). In Stage 1, a child
understands when they have done something wrong because
they are punished. In Stage 2, a child determines right and
wrong in terms of their own best interest, without regard for
the consequences to others.
The three use scenarios we present illustrate this level of moral
development in action. Maia’s designs enabled her to escape
punishment for something that she would be punished for if
she had been seen doing it, thereby (in her mind), making the
behavior acceptable. Further, Maia’s design may have violated
her mother’s privacy, but she was preoccupied by her own end
goal without consideration of potential consequences to her
mother. Similarly, Troy violates Asia’s privacy as part of a plan
to ensure that he escapes punishment for his prior crime. And
as Freya demonstrates, adults are perceived more trustworthy
than they perhaps deserve by virtue of being representative of
the moral authorities children are used to listening to in order
to avoid punishment.
It is important that developers and policymakers take chil-
dren’s level of moral development into account. One cannot
assume that children are able to grasp and internalize right
and wrong in a way familiar to adults. As such, many of the
questions require the developer or policymaker to interpret
risk through the lens of a child’s limited capacity for moral
behavior; and additional structures may need to be provided
within a given tool to actively guide children toward ethical
use.
Validating the Checklist
Future work will seek to refine and validate our Risk Miti-
gation Checklist through a series of interviews with experts
in both IoT and predatory behavior. These interviews will
focus on the novelty and comprehensiveness of the insights
generated through this methodology, i.e. what they learned
that they did not know already, how it mapped onto their list
of known concerns, and (for The Micro:bit Educational Foun-
dation consortium) how it compared with their own thought
processes in developing IoT for children. We will also explore
how, at what stage(s) in the design process, and to what end
our informants think they might make use of this Checklist; as
well as the limitations of the Checklist in attending to risks that
derive from underlying (non-technical) issues, such as parental
oversight. And finally, we will look to emerging high profile
failures of IoT for children as evidence of the importance of
asking specific questions included in this Checklist.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have described a methodology designed to
elicit privacy, security and safety risks of children program-
ming Internet of Things devices such as the BBC micro:bit.
Using a drawing-telling technique to generate data regarding
children’s desired uses of the micro:bit, we were able to iden-
tify three broad categories of use which circumscribe distinct
sets of risks to children. We made these risks tangible by cre-
ating narrative use scenarios, and then used these scenarios to
generate practical questions that developers and policymakers
can ask in creating and evaluating IoT for children.
Having been forthcoming regarding potential limitations of
the methodology, it is important to convey what we believe
the main successes of the methodology are. Principally, it has
helped formalize the process of designing out risk—a process
that organizations such as the BBC already tacitly conduct.
Certainly, the majority (if not all) of the risks we have identi-
fied through our methodology were previously known to the
makers of the micro:bit, but there are three advantages of hav-
ing arrived at them via this process. Firstly, direct participant
engagement helped ensure that actual likely uses and associ-
ated risks are explored, beyond what adults imagined children
might want to do with the technology. Secondly, the method-
ology helped validate the micro:bit’s developers’ thinking and
assuaged fears about possible unknown risks that had forced
them to proactively limit functionality. Thirdly, and most tan-
gibly, it provides a toolset (the Risk Mitigation Checklist) that
they and others might use to ensure they do due diligence in
developing a device that is safe for children. The scenarios
themselves, which describe fairly tame problem uses, are not
as inherently useful as they are generative for eliciting salient
design considerations.
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